I want to tell the story (and it is a human story, as much as it is one of technological bravura) of how a private initiative, ambition and technological innovation came together to produce the Titan, and how, when the cutting-edge capability failed and tragedy ensued, the world’s attention was brought to bear, with more questions than answers provided.
The story picks up in Seattle, Washington, at the University of Washington’s Ocean Sciences Building, home of an entrepreneurial startup called OceanGate that was building a manned submersible dubbed Cyclops 2, later renamed Titan, capable of diving to the depths of the Titanic, which lies 3,800 metres down.
Even from the beginning it was controversial. A full-size model’s first shot at the deep end of the pool imploded under pressure far below the ocean’s most extreme scenarios. But so went the project, undaunted by the dreaded sound of a doomed submarine disintegrating under its own weight.
The most hotly debated decision in the Titan’s history was the determination to build it out of carbon fibre, which advocates loved for its strength and buoyancy, making a boat that could dive deeper and safer than its metallic predecessors. The material also proved to have an unusual set of challenges, including whether it stood up under the crushing force of deep-sea pressures. The early co‑ops with the University of Washington used pioneering techniques, and Boeing’s veterans warned of risk of disaster.
Despite vocal objections from inside the industry and, critically, even from those within OceanGate’s own ranks, the project continued apace, until just days before the disaster. Three separate organizational hiccups – worries over the sub’s carbon-fibre hull, the resilience of its viewport, as well as the rigour of its testing – were each either brushed aside or downplayed. Instead of the caution borne of a millennia-long intimacy with the remorseless deep, innovation triumphed. And when innovation fails, litigation follows.
The Titan descended to the seabed in June 2023, where it quickly imploded at depth, killing five onboard. The disaster left the community shell-shocked as the risks of exploration were laid bare and reassessed. Stockton Rush, OceanGate’s pioneer of submersibles, was among those killed.
And the Titan disaster illustrated that there are limits to the technologies we can employ as we further explore the oceans – and there is no greater risk to human life than trying to uncover them.
A submersible such as the Titan is the zenith of human engineering technology: it is a machine designed to penetrate what for a human being is the most intractable environment of all. Construction of a submersible requires decades of design, months of trial runs and a host of safety procedures – all of which are necessary to avoid tragedy.
However, the Titan’s story reminds us how a journey of discovery may result in a disaster. The gestation of this project is also an admonitory tale. The human quest to plumb the undisclosable is double-edged: the urge to push the boundaries of the possible can blind us to the duty to protect those who reach into the gulfs on our behalf.
© 2024 UC Technology Inc . All Rights Reserved.